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Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of equity in controversial industry 
sectors? 
 
 
Purpose – This study examines whether corporate social responsibility influences the cost of 
equity capital of firms operating controversial industry sectors. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper computes the ex-ante cost of equity capital implied 
in analyst earnings forecasts and stock prices for a sample of 2,006 U.S. firm-year observations 
belonging to controversial industry sectors (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, military, firearms, nuclear 
power, oil and gas, cement and biotechnology) during the period 1991-2012. The baseline 
regression model links CSR score to the implied cost of equity capital (ICC) and controls for firm-
specific characteristics, industry factors, and economic or market-wide factors. This model enables 
to capture the differential effect of CSR on ICC when the firm belongs to a specific sector of the 
controversial industries by adding an interaction term between CSR and the dummy variable 
representing this belonging. 
Findings – The findings show two main results. First, CSR engagement significantly reduces the 
implied cost of equity capital (ICC) in all controversial industry sectors, taken as a group, as well 
as in each one of these sectors individually. Second, this effect is more pronounced when the firm 
belongs to the alcohol and tobacco industry sectors. 
Research limitations/implications – T 
The findings have two important practical implications. First, they should increase managers’ 
confidence and incentives, in controversial industry sectors, to pursue CSR activities. Second, 
policymakers can encourage managers to undertake CSR initiatives in controversial industry 
sectors through tax incentives (e.g., reduce taxes for CSR related investment projects). 
Originality/value –  
This paper extends prior studies that investigate the perceptions of capital market participants of 
firm’s CSR commitment (e.g., Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Goss and Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul 
et al., 2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah et al., 2013) by examining the effect of CSR on ICC in the 
controversial industry sectors. It contributes to the debate around the relevance of CSR in 
controversial sectors by providing evidence of the reduction effect of CSR activities on ICC in 
controversial industries and by showing that this reduction impact is more pronounced when the 
firm belongs to alcohol, tobacco industry sectors. 
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Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of equity in controversial industry 
sectors? 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, business corporations have devoted considerable and increasing investments 
to corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) activities in response to tremendous pressures 
coming from their stakeholders including shareholders1. Virtually all types of corporation have 
become more active in CSR domains, including those corporations belonging to controversial 
industries -that may be polemic owing to the goods or services that they provide and/or how they 
conduct themselves in the process of doing business (Du and Vieira, 2012)-. The involvement in 
CSR programs by firms belonging to controversial industries could be perceived as contradictory 
by their stakeholders because the core business of these firms can be perceived as socially and 
environmentally controversial and undesirable. The direct consequence of this stakeholders’ 
perception lead to question the benefits of CSR investments in the case of firms belonging to 
controversial industries. 
To illustrate this context, consider the case of firms operating in the oil and gas industry. By its 
nature, this industry’ operations involve many potential negative environmental and social effects, 
including land clearance, oil spills, natural gas emissions and problems with local communities 
(Frynas, 2009). However, over the years and at the sector level, important and noteworthy 
environmental improvements have taken place such as the decrease in the number and the volume 
of oil spills.2 At the firm level, significant improvements have been done or initiated such as gas 
emissions reduction, investments in renewable energy alternatives, community development 
programs aiming to build schools and hospitals, launch of micro-credit schemes for local people 
aiming to assist youth employment projects, particularly in developing countries (Frynas, 2009). 
While not all oil and gas firms are engaged in CSR activities with the same level of effort, some 
firms have been recognised as leaders in corporate citizenship worldwide and some are doing 
relatively little and it is important to know how the investor evaluates such differences in CSR 
engagement.  
In this paper, the focus is on the investor perception through the investigation of how CSR 
initiatives of firms in controversial industry sectors affect their cost of equity capital. In particular, 
we argue that CSR activities undertaken by a firm belonging to the controversial industry sectors 
reduce the required risk premium of holding its stock and therefore its cost of equity. This is 
because of the risk mitigation effect associated with CSR activities. Three theoretical arguments 
could explain the risk mitigation effect of CSR. The first argument lies on the investor perception 
that CSR involvement directly decreases firm’ risk. For instance, social responsibility enables 
firms to reduce the probability that they will face social and/or environmental crisis implying 
higher cash outflows such as costly government imposed fines and clean-up costs. By avoiding 
those future negative cash flows, CSR commitment reduces firm’s risk exposure (Godfrey, 2005; 
                                                          
1 According to US SIF Foundation (2016), the value of the total assets engaged in sustainable, responsible 
and impact investing practices at the start of 2016 is $8.72 trillion, which represents nearly 22 percent of 
the $40.3 trillion in total assets under professional management in the United States. 
2 According to Frynas (2009), the number of large oil spills (above 700 tonnes) caused by oil tankers and 
other vessels has dramatically decreased from 25.2 spills per year in the period 1970-1979 to 3.6 spills per 
year in the period 2000-2007. 
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El Ghoul et al., 2011) and consequently will decrease its cost of equity capital. The second 
argument suggests that CSR reduces asymmetric information. CSR signals the quality of 
management to investors (Akpinar et al., 2008), and as such it decreases the monitoring and 
auditing costs. The third argument stipulates that socially conscious investors will avoid stocks of 
firms with poor CSR and as a result, their shareholder base will be reduced (Hong and Kacperczyk, 
2009). This reduction translates in a limited risk sharing opportunities and therefore lower stock 
prices and higher cost of equity capital. 
This paper also argues that the effect of CSR activities on firm’ cost of equity capital is different 
depending on the controversial industry sector. There is an important heterogeneity within the 
controversial industry sectors. On one hand, the so-called "sinful" industries, e.g., alcohol, tobacco, 
and gambling are described as "controversial" based on social norms (Lindgreen et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, some industries are described as "controversial" due to the externalities (i.e., 
environmental, social, governance or ethical issues) generated by the nature of their activities, e.g., 
military, firearms, nuclear power, oil and gas, cement and biotechnology (Lindgreen et al., 2012; 
Cai et al., 2012). This difference might affect how the investor perceive and assess the value CSR 
actions. 
There are few studies that examine the impact of CSR on the cost of equity capital (e.g., Sharfman 
and Fernando, 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2011). Also, studies that explore how CSR activities impact 
corporate financial performance in the context of the controversial industry sectors are scarce 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Rodrigo and al., 2016). To the 
best of our knowledge, the impact of CSR on the cost of equity capital of firms belonging to the 
controversial industry sectors (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, military, firearms, nuclear power, oil 
and gas, cement and biotechnology) has not been examined. Consequently, this paper tries to fill 
this gap. A key to understand the contribution of this work is the distinction between firms in 
controversial industry sectors (i.e., the main business of the firm is controversial) and firms that 
are only involved somehow in controversial business issues (i.e., the main business of the firm is 
non-controversial).3 For instance, Starbucks Corporation, which is a coffee company and a 
coffeehouse chain belonging to the retail-eating places industry (a non-controversial business), is 
also involved in some activities related to alcohol which is a controversial business.4 This study 
does not include such companies. 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 2,006 firm-year observations belonging to controversial 
industry sectors covering the period from 1991 to 2012. Following previous studies, e.g., Dhaliwal 
et al. (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011), we compute the ex-ante cost of 
equity implied in analyst earnings forecasts and stock prices (ICC hereafter). In addition, we follow 
Jo and Na (2012) to assign firms to controversial industry sectors. 
                                                          
3 The work of El Ghoul et al. (2011) has explored how firm’s participation to controversial business issues, 
not CSR, affects this cost. To measure this firm’s participation, the authors used dummy variables based on 
six MSCI ESG KLD exclusionary screens (alcohol, gambling, tobacco, military, firearms and nuclear 
power). For each company covered, KLD database indicates whether the company is involved in 
controversial business issues as indicated by the screens. This implies that these screens capture both firms 
in controversial industry sectors (i.e., the main business of the firm is controversial) as well as those firms 
that are only involved somehow in controversial business issues (i.e., the main business of the firm is non-
controversial). 
4 According to the Standard Industrial Classification, Starbucks corporation belongs to the retail-eating 
places industry (SIC code 5812). 
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Our findings show two main results. First, CSR engagement significantly reduces the implied cost 
of equity capital (ICC) in all controversial industry sectors, taken as a group, as well as in each 
one of these sectors individually. Second, this effect is more pronounced when the firm belongs to 
the alcohol and tobacco industry sectors. 
This work contributes to the literature in different ways. First, it extends prior studies that 
investigate the perceptions of capital market participants of firm’s CSR commitment (e.g., 
Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Goss and Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Jo and Na, 2012; 
Bouslah et al., 2013) by examining the effect of CSR on ICC in the controversial industry sectors. 
Second, it extends those few studies that examine how CSR activities impact corporate financial 
performance in the context of the controversial industry sectors (Cai et al., 2012, and Jo and Na, 
2012). Third, it contributes to the debate around the relevance of CSR in controversial sectors by 
providing evidence of the reduction effect of CSR activities on ICC in controversial industries and 
by showing that this reduction impact is more pronounced when the firm belongs to alcohol, 
tobacco industry sectors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we discuss the corporate 
social responsibility in controversial industry sectors and its link to the cost of equity capital. In 
the third section, we describe our sample and data, and define our models and variables. We present 
and analyze our results in the fourth and fifth sections. We conclude in the sixth section. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
Although over the years corporate social responsibility commitment has become more widespread 
and continuously increasing among almost all types of firms, its financial outcomes remain an 
open question. Theoretically as well as empirically, there is no consensus yet on the effect of CSR 
activities on firm’s value and performance even though more and more studies show that the link 
is more likely positive (e.g., Margolis et al., 2007). In controversial industry sectors, the problem 
is more acute since there is a doubt and skepticism toward the core business of these firms and its 
adequation with CSR actions. Beyond the debate on the legitimacy of firms in such industry sectors 
to engage CSR initiatives5, our interest is in the financial relevance of such investments and in 
particular to know how the investor (stockholder) perceive them through the implied cost of equity 
capital. In the following section, we explain how theoretically, from a finance stand point, CSR 
can affect the firm’ cost of equity capital in controversial industry sectors.  
The cost of equity capital of a firm is the rate of return investors require for holding its stock. It 
reflects the investor’s perception of the risk associated with firm’s future cash flows. The higher 
                                                          
5 The opponents claim that CSR activities are in contradiction with the core functions of the controversial 
firms and therefore it is useless to talk about social responsible initiatives by an ‘‘irresponsible’’ corporation 
or industry. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) considers that CSR of the tobacco industry 
has an inherent contradiction because the core business of this industry is in conflict with the goals of public 
health policies with respect to tobacco control (WHO, 2003). In financial markets, some socially 
responsible investors choose to completely avoid firms in controversial industries including sin stocks such 
as those in tobacco, alcohol, gambling and military sectors.   
For the proponents, firms in controversial businesses can engage in CSR activities and bring an important 
social contribution to the whole society and or to the environment. They can do so because its their 
legitimate right (Cai et al., 2012) and because such contribution may exceed that of firms from more 
mainstream areas (Lindorf et al., 2012). By minimising the harm that would be caused if their industry was 
unregulated or banned, these companies can make a real contribution to address some social problems. 
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(lower) the perceived risk is, the higher (lower) the required risk premium and therefore the higher 
(lower) the cost of equity capital will be. 
If CSR involvement reduces firm’s risk, then one can directly link CSR to the cost of equity capital: 
the higher (lower) the CSR activities are, the lower (higher) the cost of equity will be. The key 
assumption underlying our expectation is that CSR mitigates firm’s risk. Bellow, we provide three 
arguments in support to this assumption. 
First, there are many reasons why a firm engages in CSR activities including risk management 
(Husted, 2005). Social responsibility enables firms to reduce the probability that they will face 
social and/or environmental crisis implying higher cash outflows. These cash outflows might be 
costly government imposed fines, clean-up costs in the case of environmental accidents or 
compensation related to problems associated with poor working conditions. Therefore, by avoiding 
future negative cash flows, CSR commitment will reduce firm’s exposure to risk (Godfrey, 2005; 
El Ghoul et al., 2011) and consequently will decrease firm’s cost of equity capital. Some empirical 
evidence for this theoretical argument exists. For instance, Feldman et al. (1997) find that investors 
perceive firms with higher environmental performance as less risky while Karpoff et al. (2005) 
results show that the size of stock price reaction to environmental violations is related to the 
regulatory and legal penalties. 
Second, due to information asymmetry between stakeholders and the company management, 
gathering reliable information and verifying whether management activities are aligned with the 
interest of stakeholders become expensive. CSR may signal the quality of management to investors 
(Akpinar et al., 2008), and as such it decreases the monitoring and auditing costs. Consequently, 
high (low) CSR may decrease (increase) the required risk premium for holding the company’s 
stock. Empirically, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that sin stocks, i.e., companies involved in 
producing alcohol, tobacco, and gaming, receive less coverage from financial analysts and have 
higher expected returns than do stocks of otherwise comparable characteristics. Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2015) show that socially responsible firms receive more favourable recommendations 
from financial analysts. 
Third, while finance theory suggests that investors should be perfectly diversified, various studies 
show they are not. Consequently, the investor base differs across stocks. Merton (1987) examines 
this situation using a theoretical model where investors invest only in stocks they are informed 
about. As a result, stocks of firms with smaller shareholder base and thus lower risk-sharing 
opportunities should yield higher expected returns. A similar model is developed by Heinkel et al., 
(2001) and predicts that investors demand a higher expected return as a compensation for holding 
more shares of polluting firms than they would hold in a market free of boycotts from so-called 
green investors. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide empirical evidence that socially 
controversial firms, which are disliked by an important set of social norm-constrained investors, 
have smaller shareholder base. This translates in a limited risk sharing opportunities and therefore 
to a cheap stocks prices. 
Overall, under the risk mitigation view we assume a lower cost of equity capital for firms with 
high CSR activities than for firms with low CSR activities because of a lower perceived risk, 
improved information transparency and due to a larger investor base. Thus, our first hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: CSR activities negatively affect the firm’ cost of equity capital in 
controversial industry sectors. 
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The description of the business activities as "controversial" should not hide the important 
heterogeneity that exists within the controversial industry sectors. Some industries are described 
as "controversial" based on social norms, the so-called "sinful industries", e.g., alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, and adult entertainment (Lindgreen et al., 2012). Other controversial industries are 
described as such because of the externalities (i.e., environmental, social, governance or ethical 
issues) generated by the nature of their activities, e.g., defense/weapons, nuclear, oil, cement and 
biotech (Lindgreen et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2012).  
In the same vein, the theoretical and empirical literature highlights the important role of the 
industry membership when studying the impact of CSR initiatives on firm’s characteristics and 
attributes (Hendry, 2006; O’Connor and Shumate, 2010; Beschorner et al., 2013). Firms in the 
same industry share many stakeholders and are subject to the same regulatory constraints since 
policy-makers design regulations for specific industries (O’Connor and Shumate, 2010). 
Therefore, the effect of CSR on ICC will vary across the different controversial industry sectors. 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of CSR activities on firm’ cost of equity capital is different 
depending on the controversial industry sector. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data  
Our data sample comes from the merge of four databases: MSCI ESG STATS (KLD) for social 
data; Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S for analyst earnings forecasts; CRSP for information on stock 
prices, stock returns, trading volumes, and shares outstanding; and COMPUSTAT for financial 
and accounting data. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011), we compute the cost of equity in each 
year using positive 1 and 2 years earnings forecasts as well as a positive long-term growth forecast. 
In addition, we require a positive book value per share, and that the firm belong to one of the Fama 
and French (1997) industries excluding financial and utility firms. 
We follow Jo and Na (2012) and Cai et al. (2012) to assign firms to a controversial industry sector. 
This classification includes sinful industries, as in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), such as alcohol, 
tobacco and gambling, as well as other controversial industries involved with emerging 
environmental, social, or ethical issues, such as defense-related weapons, nuclear, oil, cement and 
biotech. All SIC and NAICS codes for relevant industry sectors are reported in Appendix A. Our 
final sample is an unbalanced panel of 2,006 firm-year observations belonging to controversial 
industry sectors for the period from 1991 to 2012 as reported in Table 1. 
3.2.  Methodology 
3.2.1. Regression Model 
We follow prior studies (such as Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006 and El Ghoul et al., 
2011) in defining our regression models and in specifying control variables that affect the cost of 
equity capital. Our two baseline models directly link CSR score to the implied cost of equity capital 
(ICC) as follows:   
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𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                             (1) 
𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (2) 
Where:  
ICCi,t : Cost of equity capital of firm i in year t. 
CSRi,t: : Corporate social responsibility score of firm i in year t.
  
Dumi,t : Dummy variable indicating the firm’s belonging at time t to a controversial sector. 
CVi,t : Vector of control variables of firm i in year t. 
All these variables are defined below. 
Equation (2) enables us to capture the differential effect of CSR on ICC when the firm belongs to 
a specific sector of the controversial industries by adding an interaction term between CSR and 
the dummy variable (Dumi,t) representing this belonging.  
3.2.2. Measures of implied cost of equity capital  
For our dependant variable, we estimate the ex-ante cost of equity implied in current stock prices 
and analyst forecasts. According to this approach, the cost of equity is computed as the discount 
rate (or the internal rate of return) that equates the current stock price to the present value of all 
expected future cash flows. Several studies have used the implied cost of capital (ICC) approach 
along with forecasted earnings to estimate the cost of equity at the firm-level (e.g., Claus and 
Thomas, 2001; Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Lee, Ng, 
and Swaminathan, 2009). The ICC approach using forecasted earnings is appealing because it 
provides an ex ante cost of equity measure, as opposed to the measure provided by traditional asset 
pricing models which is based on ex post (realized) returns. 
In the literature, various models are suggested to estimate the implied cost of equity. However, 
there is no consensus as to the best model(s) so that different papers use different models. In this 
paper, we follow Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) and compute different models. 
We use five models, namely:  the Claus and Thomas model (2001); the Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan 
model (2009); the Ohlson and Juettner model (2005); the MPEG ratio model of Easton (2004) and 
the PEG ratio model of Easton (2004). A detailed description of these models and their 
implementation is reported in Appendix B.    
For each firm-year observation we compute the implied cost of equity using current stock price, 
book value per share, one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecasts, 
payout ratio, five-year annualized mean (median) growth rate (an estimate for short-term growth), 
and an estimate for long-term growth rate. 
Using the five ICC models, we obtain five different values for each firm-year observation. We 
follow Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) and compute the average of the five 
models as our dependant variable and by doing so avoid any spurious results of one specific model. 
3.2.3. Measures of corporate social responsibility  
The CSR measures that we use in this study are constructed based on the MSCI ESG STATS 
(henceforth KLD) database. KLD database assesses firms by assigning binary scores (1 or zero) 
to seven qualitative screens (both strength and concern scores) and six exclusionary screens (with 
only concern scores). The qualitative screens (or dimensions) are community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, product, human Rights, and corporate governance. The exclusionary 
screens are alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco. 
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For the purposes of this study and given the lack of consensus in the literature on how to weight 
the different KLD dimensions to produce reliable CSR measures, we follow some previous studies 
(e.g., Oikonomou et al., 2012; Bouslah et al., 2013) and use averages to compute our CSR variable. 
In addition, we exclude exclusionary screens following previous studies, (e.g., Oikonomou et al., 
2012), and because it is more appropriate for our study in which controversies captured by these 
screens are embedded in the controversial industry classification used. 
For each one out of the seven KLD dimensions, two averages are measured, respectively, for 
strengths and concerns (AVE_STR and AVE_CON): 






 

I
i
i
STR
Strength
N
STRAVE
1
1
_ ; 





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
J
j
j
CON
Concern
N
CONAVE
1
1
_  
Where 
STRN  and CONN  are the total maximum number of strengths and concerns within a given 
KLD dimension for each year. These individual measures enable us to compute an aggregate CSR 
score that we use for our analysis (CSR_index). It represents the difference between the sum of all 
the strengths’ averages and the sum of all the concerns’ averages. 
3.2.4. Control variables 
Following previous studies (e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006, and El Ghoul et al., 
2011) we control for firm-specific characteristics, industry factors, and economic or market-wide 
factors that affect the cost of equity capital. Specifically, these variables (their expected signs) are: 
beta (BETA) (+), estimated using the market model; size (SIZE) (-), measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets; the book-to-market ratio (BTM) (+); leverage (LEV) (+), computed as 
the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity; forecasted dispersion (DISP) (+), measured as 
the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts, and the consensus long-term growth 
forecast (LTG) (+). In addition, we control for year and industry effects using Fama–French (1997) 
48 industry groups. 
3.3 Data summary 
Panel A in Table 1 summarizes the composition of our sample. There are 2,006 firm-year 
observations belonging to eight controversial industry sectors (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
military, firearms, cement oil and biotech) and covering the period from 1991 to 2012. 
Respectively, oil and biotech represent 42.87 and 40.43% of our sample.   
Panel B, C and D in Table 1 report summary statistics for the implied cost of equity capital, CSR 
score and control variables of interest for our models. The mean of the ICC for the whole sample 
in panel B is 8.36%. When we split this sample according to social responsibility commitment, we 
get an ICC of 8.15% for firms with high CSR scores (panel C) lower than 8.55% for firms with 
low CSR scores (panel D). This difference supports our first hypothesis but we need multivariate 
analysis since ICC depends on other variables. 
<<Please insert Table 1 about here>> 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive results 
Table 2 provides means and mean difference tests of our key variables (ICC and CSR). The CSR 
index panel reports means and mean differences of CSR score for firms in each controversial sector 
compared to CSR score of the remaining firms in the sample (i.e., firms in other controversial 
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sectors). While the mean CSR score is -0.0385 for all controversial industries, there is certain 
heterogeneity in CSR among controversial industry sectors. Tobacco and biotech (alcohol, 
military, firearms, and oil) industries have significantly higher (lower) CSR scores than the 
remaining sample. Gambling and cement industries do not present any significant differences in 
CSR score than their sample counterpart.  
In the ICC panel, we report means and mean differences for high and low CSR firms in all 
controversial sectors and in each controversial sector individually. For the whole controversial 
sample, the ICC of firms with high CSR is significantly lower, at 1% level, than that of firms with 
lower CSR. For the individual subsamples of controversial industries, tobacco, cement and biotech 
show significant positive differences in the mean ICC. This implies that for the whole sample as 
well as for tobacco, cement and biotech industries, firms with high CSR pay lower cost of equity 
in accordance with our first hypothesis. The difference in results among controversial industry 
sectors gives support to our second hypothesis. 
<<Please insert Table 2 about here>> 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among our key variables for the 2,006 
observations in controversial industry sectors. CSR score and ICC are negatively and significantly 
correlated at the 1% level. Additionally, all our explanatory variables exhibit significant 
correlation at the 1% level with the ICC and show the expected signs (positive for BETA, BTM, 
LEV, LTG and DISP and negative for SIZE). Finally, all correlations are not high and therefore 
multicollinearity cannot be an econometric issue for our regressions. 
<<Please insert Table 3 about here>> 
4.2. Simultaneous equations system regressions 
Instead of using standard OLS regressions, we rely on simultaneous equation system estimation 
using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) regressions to examine the effect of CSR engagement on 
firm’ cost of equity capital. The OLS regressions estimation of equation 1 and 2 assumes that CSR 
is exogenous. However, CSR may not be exogenous, and therefore OLS results may suffer from 
an endogeneity problem making them biased and inconsistent. For instance, firm’s CSR 
commitment might not be independent from its cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011) 
because of reverse causality. Simultaneous equation system estimation using 3SLS regressions 
enables us to correct for such potential endogeneity problem. Our simultaneous equation system 
is as follows: 
𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                          
 
In the first (or ICC) equation, we use our basic model (equation 1 or 2) where we regress ICC on 
CSR score and the explanatory variables: beta (BETA); size (SIZE); the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM); leverage (LEV); forecast dispersion (DISP) and the consensus long-term growth forecast 
(LTG). In the second (or CSR) equation, we regress CSR score on ICC and known determinants 
of CSR engagement suggested by previous studies (e.g., Jo and Na, 2012): size (SIZE); leverage 
(LEV) and profitability (ROA). In addition, we control for year and industry effects using Fama–
French (1997) 48 industry groups.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of 3SLS regressions for our sample of controversial industry sectors. 
The coefficient of CSR variable (𝛼1) in the system of equation 1 is negative and significant at 1% 
level. The estimates of the same CSR coefficient (𝛼1) in the other systems of equation (2 to 9 
(3) 
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which integrate different dummies for controversial sectors belonging) show a same negative and 
significant result at the 1% level. Together, these results support our first hypothesis 
In the systems of equation 2 to 9, an interaction term between CSR and a dummy variable 
representing an individual controversial industry sector (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, military, 
firearms, cement, oil and biotech) is added. This interaction term (𝛼2) captures the incremental 
effect of CSR on ICC when the firm belongs to a particular individual controversial sector. 
The obtained estimates of the interaction terms reveal important differences among the 
controversial sectors. The negative and significant 𝛼2 in the system of equation 2 and 3 shows that 
the effect of CSR on ICC is more pronounced in the alcohol and tobacco sectors. By contrast, the 
positive and significant (at 10% level) 𝛼2 in the system of equation 8 indicates that the effect of 
CSR on ICC is less pronounced in the oil sector. The remaining results of the interaction terms for 
the other sectors are insignificant. These differences in the interaction terms reveal that the impact 
of CSR activities on firm’ cost of equity capital depends on the controversial industry sector which 
gives support to our second hypothesis.  
In addition, while the coefficient 𝛼1 captures the effect of CSR on ICC for the whole sample, the 
sum of 𝛼1and 𝛼2 captures the same impact for a specific industry sector. All the findings for the 
systems of equation 2 to 9 give a negative sum (𝛼1 +  𝛼2) and therefore support our first 
hypothesis for each individual controversial industry sector. 
Overall, the simultaneous equations system regressions show three main results. First, the effect 
of CSR on ICC (as measured by 𝛼1) is significant and negative in all controversial industry 
sectors. Second, the same negative impact is obtained in each controversial industry sector as 
captured by the sum of the coefficients 𝛼1and 𝛼2. Third, this effect is heterogeneous among these 
sectors. It is more (less) pronounced when the firm belongs to the alcohol and tobacco (oil) industry 
sectors.6 
<<Please insert Table 4 about here>> 
 
Our finding that CSR commitment reduces ICC of firms in controversial industry sectors is 
consistent with the literature (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah et al., 2013). 
However, the reader might wonder whether this finding implies that CSR helps firm access to 
financing. To explore this implication, we examine the relation between CSR on Kaplan and 
Zingales index (1997). We find, that CSR decreases financial constraints, and therefore improves 
firm’s access to external financing in general. This result is consistent with our finding.7 
Another implication possibility is that our finding might translates into higher firm value, cash-
flows and profitability. We explore this possibility by examining the effect of CSR on these three 
variables. We find that CSR is not significantly related to firm value and to accounting profitability 
in our sample period. However, we find evidence that CSR positively affects firm’s cash flows.8 
                                                          
6 Our results are qualitatively similar when using lagged values of CSR scores. 
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee who raise the potential effect of CSR on access to financing in controversial sectors. 
In line with our evidence that CSR reduces the ICC, we also find, that CSR decreases financial constraints, as measured 
by Kaplan and Zingales index (1997), and therefore improves firm’s access to external financing in general. The 
results are not reported and available upon request. 
8 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, our findings of CSR reduction effect on the cost of equity do not necessarily 
implies an increase or decrease of future cash-flows, accounting profits and ultimately firm value. We do recognise 
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Additionally, while our finding of the negative impact of CSR on ICC supports prior literature, 
one would wonder whether is it different from that of firms in non-controversial sectors. We test 
and find that the link between CSR and ICC for firms in controversial sectors is more pronounced 
than that for firms in non-controversial industries.9 
5. Robustness checks  
In this section, we conduct additional tests in order to examine the robustness of our results in 
Table 4. Respectively we use alternative measures of our key variables: ICC and CSR and we 
rerun instrumental variable regressions analysis.  
5.1. Alternative measures of the implied cost of equity capital  
As mentioned earlier, we follow Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) in computing 
ICC using different models: the Claus and Thomas model (2001); the Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan 
model (2009); the Ohlson and Juettner model (2005); the MPEG ratio model of Easton (2004) and 
the PEG ratio model of Easton (2004). Then, we compute the average of these five models and use 
it in our analysis. For robustness check, we re-compute two other averages using four models: the 
first three models and, respectively, the PEG ratio model of Easton (2004) and the MPEG ratio 
model of Easton (2004). We re-run our 3SLS regressions and the results are reported in Table 9 
(average ICC using PEG ratio model of Easton) and Table 10 (average ICC using MPEG ratio 
model of Easton). Only the first equation of the estimated system of equations is reported.  
The results in Tables 5 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4. Consequently, our 
earlier results in Table 4 still hold. 
<<Please insert Table 5 about here>> 
5.2. Alternative measures of CSR score 
Since there is no consensus among academics on how to measure CSR score using KLD data, 
different methods have been used in the literature. To assess the robustness of our results in Table 
4, we construct an alternative CSR score computed as the difference between total KLD strengths 
                                                          
that doing socially responsible activities and engagement are costly (i.e., it consumes money and generates expenses), 
and the academic literature is not clear about whether this helps to generate more revenue by attracting more socially 
and environmentally consumers. Such implications are more complex and beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, 
we also explore the relationships between CSR and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, accounting profit (ROA) 
and cash-flows in our sample. 
First, we follow Cai et al. (2012) and directly link firm value to CSR commitment. The results show that CSR is not 
significantly related to firm value when examining the whole sample period (1991-2012). However, when we replicate 
the work of Cai et al. (2012) whose sample period ends in 2009, we find a qualitatively similar positive and significant 
effect of CSR on firm value. Our findings imply that the relation between CSR and firm value could be heavily 
influenced by the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Second, we regress accounting profit (ROA) on CSR and a set of control 
variables. The results show that CSR does not impact firm return on assets. Third, we regress firm cash-flows on CSR 
and a set of control variables. We find that CSR commitment positively affects firm’s cash-flows. 
All the results are not reported and available upon request. 
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee who point out to the potential difference between the effect of CSR on ICC for 
firms in controversial sectors and those in non-controversial sectors. We also run our main regression for the sample 
of firms in non-controversial industries. The untabulated results show that the negative impact of CSR on ICC is more 
pronounced for firms in controversial sectors. An increase in CSR score by one standard deviation decreases the firm’s 
cost of equity capital by -0.60 % for firms in non-controversial industries and by -2.13% for firms in controversial 
industry sectors. 
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and total KLD concerns. We re-run our 3SLS regressions and the results are presented in Table 6. 
Only the first equation of the estimated system of equations is reported. 
In all systems of equations (1-9), the coefficient of CSR score 𝛼1 is negative and significant at the 
1% level which supports our earlier results in Table 4. For the incremental effect of CSR on ICC, 
captured by the interaction term (𝛼2), when the firm belongs to an individual controversial sector, 
the results are similar to those in Table 4. The coefficient 𝛼2 is negative and significant 
respectively, at the 5% and the 10% level, for alcohol and tobacco. However, the coefficient 𝛼2 
for firms in oil sector becomes insignificant.  
In summary, the three main results hold and confirm our estimates in Table 4. First, CSR score 
negatively and significantly affects ICC in the sample of firms in controversial industries (𝛼1). 
Second, CSR score negatively affects ICC in all the evaluated controversial industry sectors 
(𝛼1+𝛼2) individually. Third, the negative effect of CSR on ICC is more pronounced when the firm 
belongs to the alcohol and tobacco sectors. 
<<Please insert Table 6 about here>> 
5.3. Instrumental variable regressions 
As a robustness check of our simultaneous equations system regressions results, we use 
instrumental variable regressions. We instrument CSR variable and re-run two-stage least squares 
estimations for all models in Table 4. We follow past studies (e.g., Goss and Roberts, 2011) and 
use average industry CSR score, 3-years lagged firm’ CSR scores and a dummy variable reflecting 
whether the state in which the firm operates voted for the Democratic Candidate in presidential 
elections. 
The results of the two-stage least squares regressions are reported in Table 7. Except for the 
incremental effect of CSR on ICC for oil sector which becomes insignificant, the obtained findings 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4. Consequently, our main results in Table 4 
still hold. 
<<Please insert Table 7 about here>> 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether firm’s CSR commitment affects its cost of equity capital when the 
firm belongs to controversial industry sectors. Based on three theoretical arguments, namely, firm 
perceived risk, asymmetric information and investor base, it hypothesizes that CSR activities, 
through their risk mitigation effect, are expected to reduce required risk premium of holding firm’ 
stock and therefore its cost of equity. For our tests, we use a U.S. sample of 2,006 firm-year 
observations belonging to controversial industry sectors covering the period from 1991 to 2012. 
We find two main results. First, CSR engagement significantly reduces ICC in all controversial 
industry sectors, as a group, as well as in each one of these sectors individually. Second, this effect 
is heterogeneous among these sectors. It is more pronounced when the firm belongs to the alcohol 
and tobacco industry sectors.  
Our findings have two important practical implications. First, they should increase managers’ 
confidence and incentives, in controversial industry sectors, to pursue CSR activities. Firms in 
these sectors can undertake socially and environmentally worthy actions while benefiting from a 
cheaper equity financing costs. Moreover, these costs can be more attractive for some controversial 
sectors such as alcohol and tobacco. Second, policymakers can encourage managers to undertake 
CSR initiatives in controversial industry sectors through tax incentives (e.g., reduce taxes for CSR 
related investment projects). 
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Although we conducted a battery of robustness tests in order to ensure the validity of our results, 
our work could have some limitations that are left for future research. First, by relying on an 
aggregate measure of CSR, we are probably missing important information that can help explain 
variations in the ICC. Therefore, future research could examine the CSR-ICC link by separating 
the seven different KLD dimensions as well as strengths and concerns of these dimensions. 
Another limitation is the classification of industries as controversial. Given the scarcity of studies 
in this field, we adopted the classification of Jo and Na (2012). However, this classification could 
be limited since it does not include some other known controversial sectors such as mining, 
chemicals and transportation. Moreover, this classification treats all controversial issues equally. 
In other words, it is assumed that investors consider a similar impact of CSR on ICC in 
controversial sectors. However, investors could perceive controversial sectors differently, e.g., 
abortion and gambling may not be perceived equally by investors. Future research can explore 
other more extended and appropriate classifications that reflect the investor’s perceptions.
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Table 1: Sample distribution and Summary statistics   
Panel A: Sample distribution    Panel B: All controversial industry sectors sample 
  Firm-year observations Percent          
Alcohol 59 2.94      
 Mean Median Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Tobacco 132 6.58    ICC 0.0836 0.0792 0.0330 0.0042 0.2758 
Gambling 89 4.44    CSR index -0.0385 -0.0429 0.1050 -0.4643 0.5688 
Military 32 1.60    BETA 1.0113 0.9458 0.4495 0.1312 2.6792 
Firearms 19 0.95    BTM 0.3913 0.3335 0.3043 0 4.6518 
Nuclear energy 0 0.00    SIZE 8.6794 8.4782 1.6265 2.9857 13.1308 
Cement 4 0.20    LEV 0.2484 0.1529 0.2951 0 1.3432 
Oil 860 42.87    LTG 0.1575 0.13 0.1107 0 1.3665 
Biotech 811 40.43    DISP 0.0650 0.0401 0.0876 0 1.4390 
T0otal 2 006 100.00    ROA 0.1403 0.1311 0.1250 -0.5981 0.4885 
              
Panel C: Controversial industry sectors sample with high CSR  Panel D: Controversial industry sectors sample with low CSR 
  N Mean Median Std dev Minimum Maximum  N Mean Median Std dev Minimum Maximum 
ICC 948 0.0815 0.0764 0.0310 0.0042 0.2616  1058 0.0855 0.0809 0.0345 0.0042 0.2758 
CSR index 948 0.0293 0 0.0952 -0.1595 0.5687  1058 -0.0993 -0.0870 0.0706 -0.4643 0.2051 
BETA 948 1.0229 0.9658 0.4563 0.1312 2.6001  1058 1.0009 0.9377 0.4434 0.1312 2.6792 
BTM 948 0.3812 0.3242 0.2848 0 2.7531  1058 0.4003 0.3390 0.3207 0 4.6518 
SIZE 948 8.5562 8.2356 1.6440 2.9857 12.9023  1058 8.7898 8.6406 1.6033 3.7382 13.1308 
LEV 948 0.234 0.1501 0.2828 0 1.3432  1058 0.2614 0.1583 0.3053 0 1.3432 
LTG 948 0.1619 0.14 0.1129 0 1.3665  1058 0.1534 0.13 0.1086 0 1 
DISP 948 0.0672 0.0403 0.1046 0 1.439  1058 0.0630 0.0398 0.0689 0 0.6991 
ROA 948 0.1420 0.1361 0.1292 -0.5981 0.4885  1058 0.1388 0.1272 0.1211 -0.5742 0.4885 
This table presents the sample distribution by controversial industry sector (panel A) and displays descriptive statistics for the sample over the period from 1991 to 
2012 (panel B, C and D). Mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values are reported. Panel B reports statistics for firms in all controversial 
industry sectors. Panel C and D report statistics for firms in controversial industry sectors segmented by CSR score (high versus low). ICC is the average implied 
cost of equity obtained from five models: Appendix B provides details on the implementation of the five models. All SIC and NAICS codes used to assign firms 
to Controversial industry sectors are reported in Appendix A. The segmentation of CSR index (high versus low) is based on the industry median for each given 
year (above versus below). BETA is beta estimated using the market model; SIZE: firm’ size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; BTM:  Firm’ book-
to-market ratio; LEV is the leverage and computed as the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity; DISP is the forecast dispersion measured as the coefficient 
of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts; and LTG is the consensus long-term growth forecast. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 
the 99th percentile.       
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Table 2: Mean comparison of the key variables (ICC and CSR) 
Controversial 
Industry 
CSR_index  ICC 
Controversial 
subsample(1) 
Without 
subsample(2) 
Difference        
(2)-(1) 
 High CSR 
(1) 
Low CSR 
(2) 
Difference         
(2)-(1) 
All controversial -0.0385    0.08152 0.08551 0.00399*** 
Alcohol -0.0817 -0.0372 0 .0445***  0.10399 0.0956 -0.00839 
Tobacco 0.0040 -0. 0415 -0.0456***  0.06853 0.07368 0.00515** 
Gambling -0.0456 -0.0382 0.0073  0.08612 0.08837 0.00224 
Military -0.0836 -0.0378 0.0458***  0.07293 0.07571 0.00279 
Firearms -0.0699 -0.0382 0.0316*  0.11149 0.10305 -0.00844 
Cement -0.10068 -0.0384 0.0623  0.02519 0.10371 0.07852*** 
Oil -0.06234 -0.0207 0.0416***  0.08626 0.08888 0.00262 
Biotech -0.01351 -0.0555 -0.0420***  0.0768 0.08241 0.00561*** 
This table provides means and mean difference comparisons of our key variables (ICC and CSR).  The ICC panel gives means and mean differences for high and 
low CSR firms in all controversial sectors and in each controversial sector. The CSR index panel reports means and mean differences of CSR score for firms in 
all controversial sectors and in each controversial sector compared to CSR score of the remaining firms in the sample. The definition of ICC is provided in Table 
1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ICC (1) 1.00        
CSR index (2) -0.08*** 1.00       
BETA (3) 0.20*** -0.05** 1.00      
BTM (4) 0.15*** -0.05** 0.18*** 1.00     
SIZE (5) -0.15*** 0.01** -0.30*** -0.28*** 1.00    
LEV (6) 0.13*** -0.07*** 0.11*** 0.51*** -0.28*** 1.00   
LTG (7) 0.32*** -0.03 0.29*** -0.16*** -0.21*** -0.15*** 1.00  
DISP (8) 0.17*** -0.05** 0.24*** 0.07*** -0.16*** 0.09*** 0.45*** 1.00 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among our main variables for the 2 006 observations of firms in controversial industry sectors from 1991 to 
2012. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentile. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 4: Simultaneous equations system estimation results      
  Model with interaction in ICC equation between CSR and dummy variable 
  
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4 
ICC CSR ALC CSR TOB CSR GAM CSR 
CSR -0.179*** . -0.113*** . -0.177*** . -0.198*** . 
 (-5.628)   (-3.548)   (-5.534)   (-6.888)   
CSR*Dummy   -0.067*  -0.079**  0.040  
   (-1.781)  (-2.348)  (0.889)  
BETA 0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  
 (0.696)  (0.825)  (0.630)  (0.345)  
SIZE -0.001 -0.003* -0.000 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.003* 
 (-0.919) (-1.762) (-0.504) (-1.681) (-1.147) (-1.987) (-1.024) (-1.705) 
BTM 0.011***  0.013***  0.011***  0.011***  
 (4.666)  (5.085)  (4.548)  (4.482)  
LEV 0.008** -0.010 0.010*** -0.007 0.007** -0.009 0.008** -0.010 
 (2.450) (-1.136) (3.402) (-0.737) (2.426) (-0.933) (2.557) (-1.138) 
LTG 0.088***  0.094***  0.083***  0.089***  
 (10.937)  (12.554)  (10.487)  (11.322)  
DISP -0.013  -0.013  -0.012  -0.014*  
 (-1.629)  (-1.583)  (-1.540)  (-1.794)  
ICC   -0.803***   -0.636***   -0.973***   -0.747*** 
   (-4.091)   (-3.263)   (-4.934)   (-3.806) 
ROA  -0.034**  -0.027  -0.033**  -0.033** 
  (-2.267)  (-1.590)  (-2.204)  (-2.111) 
Constant 0.052*** 0.041 0.049*** 0.023 0.054*** 0.057** 0.052*** 0.037 
 (6.976) (1.591) (7.137) (0.875) (7.342) (2.174) (7.186) (1.410) 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 
F-test 17.19 16.44 20.40 16.93 19.66 16.52 18.19 16.11 
P-value 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4: Simultaneous equations system estimation results (Continued)  
 Model with interaction in ICC equation between CSR and dummy variable 
 System 5 System 6 System 7 System 8 System 9 
  MIL CSR FIR CSR CEM CSR OIL CSR BIO CSR 
CSR -0.187*** . -0.179*** . -0.187*** . -0.247*** . -0.161*** . 
 (-5.515)   (-5.387)   (-5.798)   (-7.113)   (-6.635)   
CSR*Dummy -0.009  -0.048  0.076  0.063*  0.018  
 (-0.218)  (-0.773)  (0.472)  (1.939)  (0.746)  
BETA 0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.000  
 (0.695)  (0.794)  (0.682)  (-0.427)  (0.099)  
SIZE -0.001 -0.003* -0.000 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003* -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.003** 
 (-0.930) (-1.716) (-0.871) (-1.768) (-1.019) (-1.841) (-0.884) (-2.252) (-1.162) (-2.048) 
BTM 0.011***  0.012***  0.011***  0.012***  0.012***  
 (4.625)  (4.664)  (4.579)  (4.683)  (4.511)  
LEV 0.007** -0.011 0.007** -0.010 0.007** -0.010 0.007** -0.006 0.008*** -0.005 
 (2.326) (-1.225) (2.385) (-1.141) (2.358) (-1.132) (2.525) (-0.659) (2.861) (-0.551) 
LTG 0.088***  0.087***  0.086***  0.082***  0.090***  
 (10.787)  (10.759)  (10.709)  (10.973)  (12.153)  
DISP -0.013  -0.012  -0.012  -0.014*  -0.016*  
 (-1.623)  (-1.554)  (-1.630)  (-1.848)  (-1.941)  
ICC  -0.772***  -0.817***  -0.846***  -1.079***  -0.887*** 
  (-3.946)  (-4.165)  (-4.340)  (-5.367)  (-4.454) 
ROA  -0.034**  -0.034**  -0.033**  -0.026  -0.021 
  (-2.329)  (-2.318)  (-2.266)  (-1.519)  (-1.156) 
Constant 0.052*** 0.039 0.052*** 0.042 0.053*** 0.046* 0.054*** 0.065** 0.054*** 0.047* 
 (6.827) (1.501) (6.835) (1.637) (7.024) (1.773) (7.894) (2.466) (7.714) (1.788) 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 
F-test 16.78 16.36 16.46 16.43 16.34 16.41 29.74 17.04 27.48 16.13 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table reports 3SLS regressions results for controversial industry sectors and control variables over 1991 to 2012 period.  The dependant variables are the average implied cost 
of equity (ICC) and CSR score (CSR) respectively in the first and the second equation of each system. ICC is obtained from five models: Appendix B provides details on the 
implementation of the five models. The dummies for controversial sectors are:  alcohol (ALC), tobacco (TOB), gambling (GAM), the military (MIL), firearms (FIR), cement (CEM), 
oil (OIL), biotech (BIO), sin industry sectors (alcohol-Tobacco-Gambling) and NonSin (military, firearms, cement, oil and biotech). BETA is beta estimated using the market model; 
SIZE: firm’ size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; BTM:  Firm’ book-to-market ratio; LEV is the leverage and computed as the ratio of total debt to the market value 
of equity; DISP is the forecast dispersion measured as the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts; LTG is the consensus long-term growth forecast and ROA is 
firm’s earning before interests and taxes on lagged total assets Appendix A provides the list of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors. The unreported industry 
controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentile. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Corporate social responsibility and alternative cost of equity capital in controversial industry sectors        
  Model with interaction in ICC equation between CSR and dummy variable 
  
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4 System 5 System 6 System 7 System 8 System 9 
  ALC TOB GAM MIL FIR CEM OIL BIO 
CSR -0.173*** -0.109*** -0.170*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.172*** -0.180*** -0.240*** -0.153*** 
 (-5.594) (-3.510) (-5.496) (-6.810) (-5.476) (-5.341) (-5.774) (-7.120) (-6.535) 
CSR*Dummy  -0.066* -0.078** 0.042 -0.012 -0.055 0.079 0.065** 0.021 
  (-1.827) (-2.393) (0.957) (-0.298) (-0.907) (0.508) (2.077) (0.878) 
BETA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.947) (1.096) (0.876) (0.609) (0.949) (1.046) (0.930) (-0.173) (0.383) 
SIZE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.425) (0.042) (-0.652) (-0.491) (-0.451) (-0.381) (-0.537) (-0.234) (-0.649) 
BTM 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (4.653) (5.067) (4.533) (4.474) (4.610) (4.659) (4.560) (4.727) (4.509) 
LEV 0.008** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (2.516) (3.479) (2.495) (2.661) (2.388) (2.452) (2.418) (2.621) (2.953) 
LTG 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.087*** 
 (10.882) (12.476) (10.435) (11.316) (10.719) (10.712) (10.642) (11.022) (12.208) 
DISP -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014* 
 (-1.368) (-1.339) (-1.286) (-1.533) (-1.356) (-1.287) (-1.371) (-1.611) (-1.736) 
Constant 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (6.834) (6.974) (7.205) (7.023) (6.695) (6.699) (6.886) (7.606) (7.528) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 
F-test 17.38 20.65 19.84 18.43 16.97 16.67 16.50 29.40 27.15 
P-value  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
This table reports 3SLS regressions results for controversial industry sectors and control variables over 1991 to 2012 period.  The dependant variables are the average implied cost 
of equity (ICC) and CSR score (CSR) respectively in the first and the second equation of each system. Only the first equation is reported to save space. ICC is obtained from four 
models: Claus and Thomas model (2001), the Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan model (2007), the Ohlson and Juettner model (2005) and the PEG ratio model of Easton (2004). Appendix 
B provides details on the implementation of the models. The dummies for controversial sectors are:  alcohol (ALC), tobacco (TOB), gambling (GAM), the military (MIL), firearms 
(FIR), cement (CEM), oil (OIL), biotech (BIO), sin industry sectors (alcohol-Tobacco-Gambling) and NonSin (military, firearms, cement, oil and biotech). BETA is beta estimated 
using the market model; SIZE: firm’ size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; BTM:  Firm’ book-to-market ratio; LEV is the leverage and computed as the ratio of total 
debt to the market value of equity; DISP is the forecast dispersion measured as the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts; and LTG is the consensus long-term 
growth forecast. Appendix A provides the list of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors. The unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentile. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
23 
 
Table 6: Alternative measure of CSR and the cost of equity capital in controversial industry sectors          
  Model with interaction in ICC equation between CSR and dummy variable 
  
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4 System 5 System 6 System 7 System 8 System 9 
  ALC TOB GAM MIL FIR CEM OIL BIO 
CSR -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (-5.617) (-4.095) (-5.531) (-6.187) (-5.548) (-5.452) (-5.678) (-5.975) (-6.308) 
CSR*Dummy  -0.068** -0.072*** 0.039 -0.000 -0.048 0.050 0.032 -0.005 
  (-2.116) (-2.587) (0.929) (-0.011) (-0.768) (0.335) (0.877) (-0.274) 
BETA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.415) (0.654) (0.375) (0.301) (0.398) (0.476) (0.419) (-0.511) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.805) (0.683) (0.610) (0.902) (0.826) (0.832) (0.780) (1.031) (0.741) 
BTM 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 (4.657) (4.950) (4.615) (4.495) (4.641) (4.674) (4.621) (3.824) (4.515) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.008*** 
 (2.676) (3.272) (2.640) (2.811) (2.640) (2.641) (2.647) (1.464) (2.973) 
LTG 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.093*** 
 (12.250) (13.022) (11.896) (12.461) (12.245) (12.189) (12.168) (10.841) (12.663) 
DISP -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* -0.016* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.017** -0.017** 
 (-1.886) (-1.772) (-1.812) (-1.932) (-1.893) (-1.836) (-1.888) (-2.161) (-1.996) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 (6.889) (7.014) (7.144) (6.858) (6.831) (6.824) (6.909) (6.766) (7.229) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006 
F-test 19.35 20.54 20 19.30 18.76 18.69 18.59 29.77 25.28 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
This table reports 3SLS regressions results for controversial industry sectors and control variables over 1991 to 2012 period.  The dependant variables are the average implied cost 
of equity (ICC) and CSR score (CSR) respectively in the first and the second equation of each system. Only the first equation is reported to save space. CSR is the total sum of 
strengths minus the total Sum of concerns. The dummies for controversial sectors are:  alcohol (ALC), tobacco (TOB), gambling (GAM), the military (MIL), firearms (FIR), cement 
(CEM), oil (OIL), biotech (BIO), sin industry sectors (alcohol-Tobacco-Gambling) and NonSin (military, firearms, cement, oil and biotech). BETA is beta estimated using the market 
model; SIZE: firm’ size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; BTM:  Firm’ book-to-market ratio; LEV is the leverage and computed as the ratio of total debt to the market 
value of equity; DISP is the forecast dispersion measured as the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts; and LTG is the consensus long-term growth forecast. 
Appendix A provides the list of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors. The unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) industry 
classification. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentile. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions results    
  Model with interaction between CSR and dummy variable 
   ALC TOB GAM MIL FIR CEM OIL BIO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CSR -0.037** -0.040*** -0.001* -0.037** -0.037** -0.036** -0.037** -0.033* -0.047* 
 (-2.427) (-2.966) (-1.768) (-2.442) (-2.462) (-2.403) (-2.427) (-1.891) (-1.719) 
CSR*Dummy  -0.074** -0.058* 0.024 0.040 -0.032 0.233 0.020 0.045 
  (-2.311) (-1.847) (0.413) (0.650) (-0.408) (0.824) (0.996) (1.617) 
BETA -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.458) (-0.055) (-0.530) (-0.442) (-0.486) (-0.443) (-0.458) (0.176) (0.123) 
SIZE 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
 (1.765) (1.530) (1.408) (1.790) (1.836) (1.777) (1.765) (1.611) (0.872) 
BTM 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (6.158) (3.080) (4.519) (6.137) (6.169) (6.172) (6.158) (3.138) (3.264) 
LEV 0.007* 0.012*** 0.005 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.015*** 0.011*** 
 (1.724) (3.564) (1.309) (1.719) (1.764) (1.698) (1.724) (4.262) (2.931) 
LTG 0.122*** 0.097*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.106*** 0.093*** 
 (12.339) (9.984) (12.870) (12.352) (12.342) (12.345) (12.339) (10.941) (9.862) 
DISP -0.033** -0.016 -0.022 -0.032** -0.033** -0.032** -0.033** -0.018 -0.022* 
 (-2.418) (-1.181) (-1.506) (-2.289) (-2.407) (-2.402) (-2.418) (-1.355) (-1.716) 
Constant 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (4.912) (7.085) (4.610) (4.888) (4.843) (4.893) (4.912) (6.677) (6.741) 
Observations 1,181 1,299 1,108 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,371 1,257 
R-squared 0.275 0.209 0.289 0.275 0.275 0.276 0.275 0.248 0.227 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sargan test 10.575 33.633 51.595 10.527 10.371 10.502 10.575 12.926 14.009 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
This table reports results from instrumental variable regressions for the cost of equity (ICC) on dummies for controversial industry sectors and control variables over 1991 to 2012 
period. Models are estimated via two-stage least squares to instrument CSR variable. ICC is the average implied cost of equity obtained from five models. Appendix B provides 
details on the implementation of the five models. The dummies for controversial industry sectors are:  alcohol (ALC), tobacco (TOB), gambling (GAM), the military (MIL), firearms 
(FIR), cement (CEM), oil (OIL), biotech (BIO), sin industry sectors (alcohol-Tobacco-Gambling) and NonSin (military, firearms, cement, oil and biotech). BETA is beta estimated 
using the market model; SIZE: firm’ size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; BTM:  Firm’ book-to-market ratio; LEV is the leverage and computed as the ratio of total 
debt to the market value of equity; DISP is the forecast dispersion measured as the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts; and LTG is the consensus long-term 
growth forecast. Appendix A provides the list of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors. The unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentile. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
List of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors 
 
Controversial 
industry sector  
Fama and French 
(1997) industry 
classification 
 
SIC codes 
 
NAICS codes 
Alcohol 4 
2100–2199 325193, 4248, 42481, 424810, 
42482, 424820, 7224, 72241, 
722410 
Tobacco 5 
2080–2085 424940, 453991, 11191, 
111910, 312, 3122, 
31221, 312210, 31222, 312221, 
312229 
Gambling - 
 
 
- 
7132, 71312, 713120, 
71329, 713290, 72112, 721120 
Military 26 
3760–3769, 3795, 3480–
3489 
336992 
Firearms - - 332992–332994 
Nuclear energy - - - 
Cement - 3240–3241 - 
Oil 30 
1300, 1310–1339, 1370–
1382, 1389, 2900–2912, 
2990–2999 
- 
Biotech - 2833–2836 - 
 
This table provides the list of SIC and NAICS codes for controversial industry sectors following 
Jo and Na (2012). 
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Appendix B:   Alternative ICC models 
 
Abnormal growth in earnings (AGE) models 
 
 
ICC model of  
Ohlson and  
Juettner (2005) 
The ICC is the value of OJr  that solves: 
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MPEG ratio model  
of Easton (2004) 
 
 
 
The ICC is the value of MPEGr  that solves: 
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PEG ratio model  
of Easton (2004) 
 
 
 
The ICC is the value of PEGr  such that: 
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Appendix B:   Alternative ICC models (continued) 
 
Residual Income Valuation Models 
ICC model of  
Claus and Thomas 
(2001) 
The ICC is the value of CTr  that solves:
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ICC model of Lee, Ng, 
and Swaminathan 
(2009) 
 
The ICC is the value of LNSr  that solve
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Earnings forecasts from year 4 to year 16 are given by: 
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The plowback rates from year 3 to year 15 are given by: 
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Variables definition across all models:  
 
𝑃0: Firm’s current stock price.  
𝑏𝑣0: Book value of equity per share at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
𝑏𝑣𝑘: Expected future book value of equity per share at time k , where 𝑏𝑣𝑘 = 𝑏𝑣𝑘−1 + 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑘 − 𝑑𝑘 
(clean surplus accounting).  
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑘: Expected future earnings per share for period ( ),1 kk   using either explicit analyst 
forecasts or future earnings derived from growth forecasts 𝑔𝑆𝑇 and 𝑔𝐿𝑇, respectively.  
𝑑𝑘: Expected future net dividends per share for period ( ),1 kk   computed as the dividend payout 
ratio ( dp ) times the earnings per share forecast 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑘.  
𝑔𝑆𝑇 and 𝑔𝐿𝑇: Short-term or long-term future growth rate, respectively.   
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑘 = 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑘/𝑏𝑣𝑘−1 
 
To estimate the ICC from RIV models, we use a numerical (iterative) procedure that equates the right and 
left hand sides of the valuation equation. Solving for r  is equivalent to minimizing the distance between 
the observed stock price and the theoretical price implied by fundamentals. We stop iterating when the 
difference between the actual price and fitted price is within 0.001. The numerical program requires a 
starting value for the ICC. We examine the sensitivity of the ICC estimates to different starting values (e.g., 
10% or 20%). The ICC estimates is restricted to be positive and set to missing otherwise. 
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Appendix C: KLD’s exclusionary screens description 
Alcohol 
- Licensing 
- Manufacturers 
- Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Alcoholic 
Beverages 
- Retailers 
- Ownership by an Alcohol Company 
- Ownership of an Alcohol Company 
- Alcohol Other Concern (through 2002) 
Gambling 
- Licensing 
- Manufacturers 
- Owners and Operators 
- Supporting Products or Services 
- Ownership by a Gambling Company 
- Ownership of a Gambling Company 
- Gambling Other Concern (through 2002) 
Tobacco 
- Licensing 
- Manufacturers 
- Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Tobacco 
Products 
- Retailers 
- Ownership by a Tobacco Company 
- Ownership of a Tobacco Company 
- Tobacco Other Concern (through 2002) 
Firearms 
- Manufacturers 
- Retailers 
- Ownership by a Firearms Company 
- Ownership of a Firearms Company 
Military 
- Manufacturers of Weapons or Weapons Systems 
- Manufacturers of Components for Weapons or Weapons Systems 
- Ownership by a Military Company 
- Ownership of a Military Company 
- Minor Weapons Contracting Involvement (1991-2002) 
- Major Weapons-related Supplier (1991-2002) 
- Military Other Concern (through 2002) 
Nuclear power 
- Construction & Design of Nuclear Power Plants 
- Nuclear Power Fuel and Key Parts 
- Nuclear Power Service Provider 
- Ownership of Nuclear Power Plants 
- Ownership by a Nuclear Power Company 
- Ownership of a Nuclear Power Company 
- Design (through 2002) 
- Fuel Cycle/Key Parts (through 2002) 
- Nuclear Power Other Concern (through 2002) 
Source: www.msci.com 
